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12. Posthumanism, New Humanism, and beyond 
 
Guillermo Díaz de Liaño and Manuel Fernández-Götz (University of Edinburgh) 
 
In this paper, we analyse some of the issues associated with the posthumanist rejection of 
Humanism. First, we discuss some of the possibilities and challenges that New Materialism 
and the Ontological Turn have brought into archaeology in terms of understanding past 
ontologies and decolonising archaeological thought. Then, focusing on the concept of agency, 
we reflect on how its use by some posthumanist authors risks turning it into an empty signifier, 
which can have ethical implications and limit archaeology’s potential for social critique. The 
concept of things’ effectancy is presented as a valuable alternative to previous 
conceptualisations of ‘object agency’. While we acknowledge the heuristic potential of many 
posthumanist proposals, we believe that humanist perspectives should not be rejected 
altogether. Instead of creating rigid divides, we argue that elements of New Humanism, as 




Posthumanism is not a homogenous concept, but rather an ‘umbrella’ term that encompasses a 
variety of approaches and schools of thought, which have in common the rejection of 
Humanism (Braidotti 2013; Ferrando 2013; 2019). Posthumanist approaches have contributed 
to challenging the numerous dichotomies pervading Western conceptualisations, such as 
human/non-human, nature/culture, subject/object, or mind/body. These divides have been 
accused of allowing the development of political strategies with lethal consequences for those 
on the ‘wrong’ side of the demarcation (Tsing et al. 2017). 
Within archaeology, posthumanist approaches include, but are not limited to, New Materialism, 
symmetrical approaches and the Ontological Turn (see Crellin & Harris; Fernández-Götz et 
al., this volume). Most of them have rejected conventional Western metaphysics (Olsen et al. 
2012) and their hierarchical ontologies, proposing instead the use of flat ones with no aprioristic 
assumptions; among the alternatives, those following Object-Oriented Ontologies (Harman 
2018) and Actor-Network Theory inspired models (Latour 2005) enjoy a prominent place. 
Although new materialist and symmetrical approaches have rejected Western Humanism, they 
still draw their alternatives predominantly from other Western thinkers (Alberti 2016a, 140). 
New Materialisms have been included within the Zeitgeist of ‘Radical Enlightenment’ and 
‘Spinozism’ (Ribeiro 2016a, 232) and located within the neo-baroque (Criado-Boado 2016, 
157). They portray a world which is understood as in motion, full of inherent vibrancy (Alberti 
2016a, 141), inspired by concepts such as ‘vital materiality’ (Bennet 2010) or ‘vibrant matter 
and energy flows’ (DeLanda 2006).  
In this paper, we would like to address some of the challenges that can arise from certain 
applications of posthumanist perspectives (see also McGuire; Van Dyke; Ribeiro, this volume), 
focusing particularly on the way they have addressed the need for alternative ontologies, the 
debates around non-human agency, and the problems surrounding the notion of ‘things-in-
themselves’. Although we recognise the potential of many posthumanist approaches, we 
nonetheless believe that some of their proposals and applications entail risks that should be 
taken into account. Rather than rejecting Humanism altogether, we think that some of its 
aspects, when redefined within the framework of New Humanism (Wentzer & Mattingly 
2018), still hold value for the future.  
 
Ontological challenges: The value of situatedness and the ontology of the Other 
The possibility of exploring alternative ontologies is undoubtedly an attractive task for any 
archaeologist. However, there are some aspects to consider. As Alberti (2016b) points out, 
when addressing the Other’s ontology, our research can be mundanely ontological or critically 
ontological. The first approach implies an attempt to understand non-Western (or non-
contemporary) ontologies, while accepting that we are ‘condemned’ to use our own categories 
in order to understand alterity. The critically ontological approach, for its part, states that it is 
possible to understand other ontologies and at the same time use this very research process as 
a way of decolonising our own. This would lead to a more egalitarian engagement with the 
Other’s ontology, although with the limitation of the ‘ontological violence’ that we exert when 
simplifying other ontologies in our attempt to understand them. 
None of these options necessarily implies a complete rejection of Western ontologies. While 
we agree on the need to deconstruct and decolonise our own ontology, we believe that this task 
can only be partially achieved, as we cannot deny the fact that our intellectual enterprise as 
archaeologists is deeply embedded within our own cultural background (see also Preucel, this 
volume). Traditionally, archaeology has believed that situatedness and subjectivity only have 
corrosive effects on research processes; therefore, the only thing that one could do was to 
acknowledge them as a sort of honest contextualisation that could help others understand biases 
and how they might affect research. However, multiple authors are pointing out how 
situatedness, when facing alterity and failing to comprehend it, can become a powerful heuristic 
tool. In this sense, Alberti (2016a, 143) has explored the role of ‘wonder’, while ‘awkwardness’ 
has also been popular in anthropology as a mechanism to realise that something is ‘out of place’ 
and requires further exploration (Callan 2014; Hume & Mulcock 2004). Both ‘wonder’ and 
‘awkwardness’ can only come into play if we accept that our ‘modern constitution’ á la Latour 
(1993), is framing our understanding of the world.  
Posthumanist approaches propose the rejection of the ontologies characterising this ‘modern 
constitution’, arguing instead for the use of new ontological frameworks that can challenge 
conventional Western metaphysics (Holbraad & Pedersen 2017, 35; Olsen et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, with some exceptions (e.g. Cipolla 2019; this volume; Marshall, this volume), 
many new materialist approaches, as well as most symmetrical ones, draw their ‘new’ 
frameworks from other Western thinkers, or thinkers working within the intellectual 
framework of Western academic power structures and discourses (Alberti 2016a, 141; see also 
Van Dyke, this volume). 
One of the core premises of the Ontological Turn, the notion of ‘taking people seriously’ 
(Henare et al. 2007; Holbraad 2012; Holbraad & Pedersen 2017), can also prove problematic. 
As noted by some anthropologists, taking the narratives of Indigenous peoples literally often 
implies denying them the symbolic and metaphoric capacity that Western anthropologists grant 
themselves (Astuti 2017). Anthropology has a long tradition of being an extractivist practice 
(Burman 2018), and some applications within the Ontological Turn are dangerously close to 
‘vampirising’ Indigenous ontologies from the Global South, while at the same time maintaining 
the dynamics of power that place discourses from academics working at Western institutions 
on the top of the knowledge pyramid (Todd 2016). Thus, instead of listening to other voices 
and fostering debate, there is a risk that the ethnographer (or archaeologist) turns into a creator 
of worlds, while maintaining that the reality of those worlds cannot be discussed. This 
movement has been criticised as being potentially theoretically intolerant (Graeber 2015). 
 
On agency, ethics and effectancy 
The attribution of agency to non-human entities and the very meaning of the concept have been 
one of the main areas of dispute between some posthumanism representatives and their critics 
(e.g. Lindstrøm 2015; Olsen & Witmore 2015; Ribeiro 2016a, 2019; Sørensen 2016; Van Dyke 
2015a). It is true that the debate has often been oversimplified, that there are notable variations 
within posthumanist approaches and that some scholars are now explicitly arguing for a move 
‘beyond agency’ in favour of other notions such as affect (Crellin & Harris, this volume). 
However, discussions around object agency and its implications are still playing a significant 
role in current archaeological thinking. To take the example of recent debates on the Roman 
world, Versluys has urged colleagues to follow the ‘object turn’ or ‘material-cultural turn’ in 
order to make “material culture, with its stylistic and material properties (and thus agency 
[…]), central to our understanding of the Roman world” (Versluys 2014, 16), and to “rewrite 
history as a particular relationship between objects and people with things as the agents 
provocateurs of (historical) change” (Versluys 2017, 192). The shortcomings of this and 
similar object-agency focused approaches become evident when analysing the military-led 
expansion of the Roman state, which was frequently associated with episodes of mass violence, 
enslavement and sometimes even genocide (Fernández-Götz et al. 2020). Thus, Versluys’s 
(2014, 19) proposal that “Romanization is about understanding objects in motion” risks 
obscuring or forgetting not only the human suffering caused by the military campaigns and 
their aftermath, but also the ethical responsibility of political leaders and the marked social 
inequalities existent within Roman society. 
When criticising how some posthumanist scholars are diluting notions of responsibility, 
Ribeiro (2016a, 232) states that “underlying this trend is a deflation of linear causation as 
represented by the natural sciences and of teleological reasons as represented by the human 
sciences”. In that sense, it could be argued that social responsibility stops having its locus in 
the human agent, to be transferred into a sort of amalgam of networks/assemblages (Lindstrøm 
2015, 211), a movement that has received important criticisms outside of archaeology due to 
its potential political consequences (Choat 2018). For example, Malm (2018), a human 
geographer, has argued that the exclusion of intentionality from agency makes it impossible to 
conceive the collective action required to stop climate change, while at the same time denies 
the possibility of accusing those who are consciously causing the problem. 
Lindstrøm (2015, 221) has drawn attention to how the ‘one-size-fits-all’ notion of agency 
applied, among others, by many symmetrical archaeologists can lead to confusing effects and 
acts, as well as effectants and actants. The main difference between both notions is the 
existence of intentionality, self-reactiveness and self-reflectiveness (Bandura 2006), which 
would qualify certain effects/effectants to become acts/actants. Without intentionality, it seems 
impossible to distinguish between effects and acts. Intentionality does not preclude unintended 
consequences, but it carries with it responsibility. As Ribeiro (2016a, 231; this volume) points 
out, this implies the agent’s capacity to act (or not), and thus it is not only about producing an 
impact, but also about being able to understand that there might be consequences. 
Following Robb (2015), we could consider that things have a type of agency in the sense that 
they act back on people, but this would be different from human agency. Humans have the 
agency of ‘why’ with intentional acts and effects, while things have the agency of ‘how’, as 
they provide channelled means for people to act through (Robb 2015, 168). To what extent this 
type of things ‘agency’ should still be labelled as such is open to debate. A terminological 
alternative is provided by Stockhammer’s (2019) concept of the effectancy of things, which 
can serve as a useful counter-notion to human agency while at the same time avoiding the risk 
of anthropomorphising things.   
 
Object fetishism and power structures 
Among the main claims of symmetrical approaches (and some authors within New 
Materialism) is that archaeology needs to go back to ‘things-in-themselves’ (Olsen 2010; 
Witmore 2007; 2014). According to this view, archaeology has become too anthropocentric, 
ignoring the materiality of things and their value in themselves, analysing them only in relation 
to people. Although it can be argued that attending to things-in-themselves also places us in a 
better position to understand people-in-themselves, as they are mutually constitutive (Fowles 
2010, 24), the issue arises when this tendency is taken to the extreme (Preucel 2016). After all, 
it is the presence of humans which defines the limits of archaeology (Lucas 2012, 259-260), 
distinguishing it from other disciplines such as palaeontology. The application of ‘things-in-
themselves’ within archaeology has also been criticised on more fundamental grounds: in 
philosophy, where it originated, it has been argued that the concept lays beyond the reach of 
empirical science (Nielsen 2019). 
The argument that things have not received enough attention or that archaeology has been too 
anthropocentric is also highly disputable. In fact, we would claim the opposite: for most of its 
history as a discipline, archaeology has not focused enough on humans (see also Gardner, this 
volume), while objects and their analysis have consistently received more consideration. This 
is exemplified within the culture-historical paradigm and in many processual approaches. The 
former (still very influential in many countries) is characterised by a widespread interest in 
artefact catalogues, object typologies and chronologies, often seen as the main goal in 
themselves within narratives that leave very little or no space for humans. Processual 
archaeology approaches from the 1970s-80s, for their part, were the subject of critiques by 
early postprocessualists who accused them of often falling into the trap of producing a 
‘dehumanised’ past in which individuals played a rather minor role compared to statistics, 
systems and environmental factors.  
Although coming from a very different angle than culture-historical archaeology, there is a 
clear risk that some posthumanist views –particularly those within the so-called ‘second-wave 
of symmetrical archaeology’ and advocating Object-Oriented Ontologies (Witmore, this 
volume; see also analysis in Crellin & Harris, this volume)– might lead to a new type of object 
fetishism or ‘antiquarianism’ (Barrett 2016). Characteristic of these perspectives is a shift in 
attention from individuals and communities to non-human entities, sometimes even without 
human presence. There can be no doubt that contemporary society has facilitated the creation 
of networks of relationships between humans, animals and objects that are denser than ever 
before (Hodder 2012). But this phenomenon has not come into existence out of nowhere: it has 
been connected with the influence that computer science is having in philosophy (Berry 2014, 
103), but also, and more concerning, with the philosophical embodiment of capitalist realism 
(Galloway 2013, 364).  
The ‘defence of things’ (Olsen 2010) has also adopted an ethically questionable direction in 
the works of some symmetrical authors. This is epitomised in Olsen’s (2003, 100) statement 
that “Archaeologists should unite in a defence of things, a defence of those subaltern members 
of the collective that have been silenced and ‘othered’ by the imperialist social and humanist 
discourses”. The issues of equating things and people as ‘subalterns’ have been pointed out by 
several authors (e.g. Fowles 2016; González-Ruibal 2006, 123; McGuire, this volume), 
including from within posthumanist perspectives (Cipolla 2017, 226). 
The overemphasis on ‘things’ (or non-human beings in general) can be potentially dangerous, 
as it limits archaeology’s scope for social analysis and critique at a time where it is more needed 
than ever before in light of growing inequalities and reactionary populism (González-Ruibal et 
al. 2018; Popa 2019). As pointed out by Van Dyke (2015b), the privileged position of 
archaeology for political engagement seems to be ‘problematic’ in the eyes of some 
posthumanist thinkers. Thus, authors within this wider framework have frequently focused on 
what González-Ruibal (2019) labels as ‘soft politics’ or ‘political agnosticism’, with narratives 
that pay little attention to issues such as class differences, power inequalities, oppression and 
violence. This does not necessarily need to be the case, and there are several exceptions, 
particularly coming from posthuman feminism (see for example Fredengren, this volume) and 
from those applying non-Western perspectives (Cipolla 2019). However, so far hard power 
structures and the darkest aspects of social life have received rather little attention by a large 
proportion of posthumanist archaeologists, especially within symmetrical approaches (Hodder 
2014). This is, perhaps, one of the main tasks ahead. The necessity to pay greater attention to 
power asymmetries, even by authors in favour of object-centred perspectives, has been rightly 
summarised by Jiménez (2020, 1644) in her reflection on the Roman world: “Objects did not 
move in a transnational free market […] Ignoring the power imbalance is not conducive to 
better insights to build artefact-driven historical narratives, and in some cases may even be 
misleading”.  
 
Where are we heading? Posthumanism, New Humanism and Post-post-humanism  
We believe that a complete rejection of Humanism is unproductive and potentially dangerous. 
To start with, critics of Humanism should acknowledge that this term does not designate a 
homogeneous concept. Fassin (2019), for example, distinguishes three major lineages in its 
genealogy, which he designates as Humanism I, II and III. As Posthumanism is an umbrella 
term that encompasses multiple approaches, so too is Humanism: neither of them should be 
oversimplified or disregarded in their entirety. Although the complete rejection of core 
elements of the Western world (e.g. Humanism, Modernity) might sound appealing in an 
academic world that often fetishises theoretical ‘newness’ (Ribeiro 2016b), novel reflexive 
critiques could often benefit from integrating elements of Modernity’s legacy of knowledge 
and experience (Criado-Boado 2016, 157; Preucel, this volume).  
It is worth keeping in mind that posthumanist perspectives are reflecting wider trends in society 
that are inextricably linked to the rapid growth of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology, 
which are in the course of diluting the boundaries between humans and non-humans in ways 
that we can still not fully comprehend (Barrat 2013; Lanier 2014; Wolff 2017). Moreover, the 
rise of Posthumanism is taking place at the same time that the Humanities are increasingly 
under attack on a global scale, with dramatic cuts in funding and reduced social appreciation, 
which poses a direct threat to critical thinking and ultimately democracy (Nussbaum 2010; 
Trepanier 2018). While heading into an unknown future, perhaps we should keep in mind some 
of the core values of Humanism in a philosophical and ethical sense (e.g. Wolff 2010; 2017; 
Zuboff 2019). 
Thus, instead of rejecting Humanism altogether and throwing the baby out with the bathwater, 
it is worth reflecting on the call for a New Humanism that has recently been proposed in 
philosophical anthropology by authors such as Wentzer and Mattingly (2018) and Simonsen 
(2012). According to their perspective, this would imply an approach that “is not committed to 
religious or metaphysical claims concerning human essence or human superiority. It does not 
appeal to a secular antireligious cultural movement, nor to a developmental stage in (Western-
dominated) human civilization. Rather, our proposal marks a commitment to deal with ‘the 
human’ as a common and indispensable denominator for the ontological and ethical domains 
of anthropology and adjacent disciplines” (Wentzer & Mattingly 2018, 146). Viewed from this 
angle, New Humanism is both a critique of some of the dangers of traditional Humanism, and 
also a call for caring about humans in a world increasingly facing dehumanisation (Porpora 
2017), while at the same time committing to global sustainability (Bokova 2010; D’Orville 
2015).   
In what concerns archaeology, we argue for an approach that is focused on the study of the 
human past, not in order to reinforce obsolete notions of ‘superiority’ or ‘progress’, but to 
understand the non-linear, multivocal and multifaceted diversity of human experiences in time 
and space and its interrelatedness with non-human entities. We consider that the presence of 
the human is an imperative if we are doing archaeology, but we understand that humanness is 
constituted and performed differently through time and space, thus including a diverse and 
changing array of non-human entities and relationships. Archaeology, from this perspective, is 
not the ‘discipline of things’, but rather the study of humans through things and in relation to 
things.  
Grasping the complexity and diversity of the past requires a variety of theoretical approaches 
and viewpoints, and most archaeologists already employ a range of perspectives to achieve 
this. Fluid approaches that allow for different theoretical elements to be assembled seem more 
inclusive and fruitful than establishing rigid divides between pro- and anti-humanist 
approaches. Thus, some posthumanist perspectives can be incorporated by authors who, as we 
do, see value in maintaining the centrality of humans within archaeological studies. Perhaps, 
as Fassin (2019, 37) suggests, a Post-post-humanism will develop in the near future, which 
“would not be a mere return to the varieties of humanism that we have known, with their 
historical flaws and ethical ambiguities, but would affirm the categorical imperative of a 
critical approach to human worlds in a time when they are faced with multiple menaces that 
affect both humans and nonhumans […]. This post-post-humanism would remind us that much 
of what happens to human beings and to the world that they inhabit is the result of human 
actions and therefore involves human responsibility – notwithstanding the ambiguity of the 
word human”.  
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